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OF GEORGE W.


I am persuaded that the disadvantages of an air strik are too great for us to undertake. I have, therefore, con cluded that the blockade plan -- while by no means wholly satisfactory -- is the course we should follow.

In reaching this conclusion I have begun with the assumption that the Soviet nuclear build-up in Cuba does not add appreciably to the Soviet ability to impose destru tion on the United States. The Soviet Union already has a substantial number of ICEM's targeted on American installations. For the time being the slight additional increment of destructive capacity provided by the MRM's and IMM's Cube might have some marginal significance. As the Soviet Union accumulates additional numbers of ICEM's even this transitory advantage will tend to disappear.

If this assumption be valid -- and I have heard no compelling arguments against it -- then the menace we face is not the addition of new Soviet military capabilities so much as their moral and propaganda advantage. As I understand it, the proponents of the strike plan insist that what we are facing is a test of will that will be witnessed by all the world. Unless the United States is prepared to use demisive military power, the world will lose confidence in our strength and determination.

But I think that -- far from establishing our moral strength -- we would, in fact, alienate a great part of the sivilized world by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to our traditions; by pursuing a course of action that would end directly affinert everything we have stood for during matters matery, and condem us as hypocrites in the estates of the world.

We tried Japanese as war criminals because of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. We condemned the Soviet action in Hungary. We took a strong moral line against the use of force by the French and British at Suez when the felt their vital interests were threatened. We have taken strong line in the United Mations and in other world counci against the dangers of a surpise attack with nuclear weapon



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It is my strongly held view that we cannot launch a surprise attack against Cube without destroying our moral position and alienating our friends and allies. If we were to do so we would wake up the following morning to find that we had brought down in ruins the structure of alliances and arrangements and that our whole post-war effort of trying to organize the combined strength of the Free World was in shards and tatters.

I find the blockede plan unsatisfactory -- primarily because it does not provide a way to present the Soviet missiles from becoming operational. But, on the assemption I have stated above, I do not believe that this is a dome clusive argument against it. While the blockede may make some arickiness with other Free World nations, it will be generally accepted as a legal mass and consistent with our traditions. Particularly if the blockede includes PEL is can, within a relatively short time, bring the Cuben economy to a screeching halt. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union will have the choice either of running the blockede or of accepting it with the intention of creating a counter-thrust elsewhere. If it accepts the blockede the Cubens will feel isolated and desserted and I think the days of the Castro regime will be numbered.

